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The literature on inter vivos and intergenerational transfers has largely focussed on
the possible determinants of such transfers. Specifically, much of the empirical work
has examined whether transfers are driven by altruistic relationship between
“dynastic” households. However, the empirical literature has consistently overlooked
the possibility that transfers may be driven by specific events in the recipients’ lives
like marriage, childbirth and illness. Further, it has not addressed the possibility that
within a reasonably long time frame – say, one year – transfers may influence
household income as much as household income influences the probability and
magnitude of transfers. This paper addresses these lacunae in the existing literature.
Using GSOEP data from the 1996 and 1997 surveys, it shows that demographic and
other events determine transfers to a significant extent, and also that overlooking the
possible endogeneity of income may lead to bias in the econometric estimations.
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1. Background
The genesis for the exploration of motives underlying inter vivos transfers, of which
intergenerational transfers are a special case, lay in the seminal papers of Barro (1974)
and Becker (1974). The issue has survived the test of time, and has once again
emerged as an important part of the economists’ research agenda. There are primarily
two reasons behind this surge of interest. First, an important implication of Barro’s
analysis is that any increase in social security benefits accruing to a member of the
“dynastic” household would crowd out, perhaps even dollar for dollar, private intra-
household transfers to that individual. Since the efficacy of publicly provided social
security benefits, including non-monetary transfers like health care, is the focus of a
major public policy debate, a better understanding of the motives underlying
intergenerational transfers has become imperative.
Second, it has been argued that social security provisions that can provide cushion
against a drop in consumption during old age may reduce “life cycle” savings, and
hence reduce the volume of aggregate domestic savings (Lee, Mason and Miller,
2000). It is fairly obvious that, in the presence of appropriate social norms, private
intergenerational or inter vivos transfers may also provide the aforementioned
cushion, and thereby affect household and aggregate domestic savings. Many
developing countries do not have publicly funded social security but have social
norms that encourage private transfers. Further, industrialised countries are finding it
increasingly difficult to sustain well funded social security systems, and hence private
transfers may become increasingly important in these countries in the foreseeable
future. Once again, therefore, it is important to understand the factors determining the
probability of occurrence and the magnitude of private transfers.
The series of studies that were motivated by Cox (1987) largely focus on whether, and
to what extent, inter vivos transfers are motivated by altruism. Cox himself found that
the amounts of inter vivos transfers were positively related to the incomes of the
recipients, an observation that contradicts the logic of altruism. Indeed, if parents and
children are bound together by altruistic motives, then each of these two generations
would be interested in preserving the consumption-welfare level of the other
generation. This would imply that a transfer from one generation to the other would
be induced by a fall in the income of the recipient generation. This logic was further
extended by Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff [henceforth AHK] (1992). They argued
that, in the presence of altruism on the part of (say) a parent, if the parent’s income
goes down by one dollar, and simultaneously the child’s income goes up by one
dollar, then there would be one dollar less of transfers from the parent to the child.
1
                                                          
1  McGarry (2000) calls this the “derivatives” hypothesis, and argues that it would not hold
“under reasonable assumptions about the formation of expectations about future income.” Indeed, the2
The basic Cox-AHK line of argument has been extended, and tested in many different
ways (Cox, 1990; Cox and Jimenez, 1992, 1993; Bhaumik and Nugent, 2000;
McGarry, 2000). Further, alternative motives for inter vivos transfers like strategic
motives have been brought into light (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1992; Cox
and Stark, 1994; Pezzin and Schone, 2000). However, that altruism drives inter vivos
transfers remains the null hypothesis for much of the empirical literature on
intergenerational transfers, and, more generally, private transfers among members of
dynastic households.
As such, the aforementioned null hypothesis is tested using a rule of thumb which can
be highlighted using the paradigm of a simple probit or Tobit model in which a binary
indicator of the occurrence of transfer or the amount of transfer itself is the dependent
variable.
2 Other things remaining the same, if the coefficient of income and/or the
variable representing publicly provided benefits is negative and significant, it is
argued that the data manifests the type of crowding out of private transfers, by other
sources of income and consumables, that is consistent with the logic of altruism.
This paper argues that the stylised empirical methodology is seriously flawed on two
different counts. First, income or publicly provided monetary and non-monetary
benefits per se may not be the determinant of the private transfers. Such transfers are
more likely to depend on events in the recipients’ lives, viz., marriage, illness, and
childbirth. Hence, at the very least, if a specification does not control for such events,
the estimates would be vulnerable to omitted variable bias. Second, if the recall period
of the data is as large as one year, it is reasonable to assume that transfers may affect
income even as income may affect transfers. For example, if the parents of a young
couple provide financial support to the latter such that the grandchildren can be sent to
a day care centre, the female in the younger household may be able to join the labour
force more effectively than otherwise, and this would certainly have a positive impact
                                                                                                                                                                     
linear relationship between income and private transfers implied by the “derivatives” hypothesis can be
brought into question with a simple construction. If a fall in the income of (say) a child can be viewed
as not only a decline in the current income, but also as a signal of the possibility that her future incomes
might also be low, altruistic parents would have to transfer more to the child not only to counteract the
latter’s low income during the current period, but would also have to compensate her for lower income
in the future periods. Hence, the strict dollar-for-dollar crowding-out implied by the “derivatives”
hypothesis will not hold.
2  The rationale for using a probit model with transfer (1) and no transfer (0) as the binary
dependent variable is obvious. The case for use of a Tobit model is more involved. It can be argued, for
example, that a transfer is made by a donor if the act of making the transfer pushes her utility beyond
some unobserved threshold. If u denotes utility, and u* denotes the threshold level of utility, we can
argue that a transfer is observed if u > u*, and not otherwise. In other words, the distribution of
transfers is censored, and hence the appropriate econometric formulation for its analysis is the Tobit
model.3
on the latter household’s income. If such simultaneity exists, and yet is not taken into
consideration, once again the resultant empirical estimates may be biased.
The analysis presented in the subsequent sections of the paper goes on to show that
“events” in the recipients’ lives do matter, and have a significant impact on the
probability of receiving a private transfer as well as the magnitude of the transfer. It
also shows that income and transfers have a significant impact on each other, and
therefore the appropriate method of estimation would be one using a simultaneous
equation system. Section 2 of the paper expands on the rationale underlying the
argument that the existing empirical methodology is flawed. Section 3 discusses the
data used for the subsequent empirical analysis, namely, the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP). It also provides a framework for the empirical analysis. The
empirical results are presented and analysed in section 4. Section 5 concludes, and
suggests possible extensions of the analysis.
2. The Lacunae in the Empirical Literature
The literature on inter vivos (and hence intergenerational) transfers suffers from two
shortcomings. First, it does not take into account the fact that households and
individuals neither give nor receive transfers continually.
3 Indeed, it is reasonable to
assume that if households and individuals are altruistic, they would provide monetary
support to others within the extended family or “dynastic” household in times of need,
such that the consumption level of the recipient individual or household is sustained
in the face of some crisis. For example, incidence of monetary transfers within a
parent-child cohort may be high following marriages of the children, during periods in
which the children suffer prolonged and serious illnesses, and when the children are
out of work, in the absence of adequate unemployment compensation. Similarly,
monetary transfers from the children to the parents are more likely to be observed
during illnesses of the latter, and if the social security benefits of the aged parents are
inadequate. In other words, it might be possible to observe transfers from a parent to a
child during the latter’s year of marriage, (say, 30
th), year of major illness (say, 33
rd),
and year of temporary unemployment (say, 39
th), and not during the other years of the
adult child’s lifetime.
The implications of this proposition are significant. As mentioned above, the usual
“test” for altruism is to observe whether the probability of receiving a transfer and the
magnitude of transfer vary inversely with the income of the recipient individual or
                                                          
3  The transfers from children to elderly people in developing countries are often an exception to
this “rule.” In the absence of publicly funded social security provisions, and in the absence of life cycle
savings, a large section of the elderly population in such countries may require continual transfers from
their children for survival. In those contexts, the stylised empirical analysis may be more appropriate
(Cox and Jimenez, 1992, 1993; Bhaumik and Nugent, 2000).4
household, and/or with the existence and extent of public support in the form of social
security benefits.
4 Let us assume that there are two households with the same income
x, and that each household has a potential donor within its extended family, each
donor’s household income being y. Let us assume further that each of the potential
recipients have the same non-income characteristics. Does this imply that during any
time period either both or neither of these households would receive a transfer? It is
obvious that this is very unlikely. For example, if one of the potential recipients fall
prey to some illness, she would be more likely to receive transfers from her extended
family. In other words, the (lack of) variation in x, y and other explanatory variables
would not be able to explain the fact that one of the potential recipients would
actually receive a transfer while the other household would not. If, however, the
specification includes an indicator of the health of the potential recipients, the
asymmetry in the occurrence of transfer can be explained. Clearly, any examination of
the motives underlying private transfers without controlling for income-reducing and
expenditure- augmenting events in the lives of the recipient would not be
meaningful.
5
Further, this issue has implications for the savings behaviour of households. Let us
assume that individuals and households save only for their old age consumption. If so,
bequests can be explained only by the fact that death cannot be predicted as such, and
hence a bequest is the difference between the expected old age consumption of an
individual or couple and their actual consumption. In such an event, if individuals are
able to fully annuitise their old age income-consumption by way of publicly funded
pension and medical care, their propensity to save would decline. In other words, if a
country experiences either the introduction of a new public pension system, or a
reduction of the benefits of such a system, the implications for (aggregate) household
savings may be significant. On the other hand, if bequests reflect, at least in part, the
precautionary saving on the part of an individual or household to protect other
“dynastic” households from income-consumption shocks,
6 the impact of a change in
the public pension and medical care regime on household savings would be much
more muted.
                                                          
4  If information is available about the donor’s individual or household income, it may be used
as a control variable because a low income household, for example, may not receive a transfer from
another low income household within the “dynasty,” even if the former household is in need for such a
transfer per se. However, most surveys do not provide the relevant information about the donor, and
hence studies in general are unable to control for this factor.
5  The only important piece of research acknowledging the limitation of the stylised methods of
testing can be attributed to McGarry (1997).
6  In other words, a bequest may, at least in part, be a consequence of the fact that “events” in the
lives of the “dynastic” households cannot be fully anticipated. It is evident that such a view of bequests
is closely associated with the proposition that transfers are triggered by specific events in the lives of
the recipients.5
There is one other aspect of inter vivos (and hence intergenerational) transfers that has
not been adequately addressed in the existing literature, namely, the impact of the
transfers on the earning potential of the recipients. It is obvious, for example, that
people incur search costs when looking for jobs, and it would be reasonable to assume
that the reservation wage of an individual depends on her ability to bear these costs.
Indeed, policymakers have often argued that, therefore, it might not be advisable to
provide a high level of unemployment benefit for an indefinitely long period of time.
Hence, if, in the event of unemployment, an individual receives support in the form of
private transfers, she is likely to be able to search for an appropriate job for a longer
period of time, thereby increasing the probability of getting a higher paid job than she
otherwise would. Similarly, as mentioned above, transfers may enable a member of
the household to effectively join the labour force, and thereby augment both her own
and the household’s income. In other words, transfers can have an impact on an
individual’s or a household’s income.
7
One should note, however, that it is by no means obvious that the impact of private
transfers on household income would necessarily be positive. For example, if a parent
supports a child during a spell of unemployment, the child may spend much of the
recall period searching for an appropriate job. In such an event, the child’s income
registered for the recall period might be lower than what it would have been in the
absence of a transfer, which may have forced the child to reduce the search period.
Similarly, following a childbirth, an event which would increase financial pressure on
a household, if the parents of either of the spouses provide support in the form of
private transfers, the female of the couple may stay back at home during the recall
period to take care of the child. In that case, the impact of the private transfers on the
household’s income would be negative. In sum, the impact of private transfers on
personal and household income is indeterminate.
Any empirical analysis of private inter household transfers should, therefore, involve
a simultaneous equation system which treats income as an endogenously determined
variable. However, the literature on inter vivos transfers treats income as an
exogenously given explanatory variable influencing the probability and magnitude of
transfers. An interesting deviation from this trend is the research of Pezzin and
Schone (1998) which attempted to “predict jointly the combination of household
membership [i.e., co-residence of parents and children], labour force participation,
informal care and financial transfer provision resulting from parent and daughter
                                                          
7  In light of the argument put forward by McGarry (2000), it can be argued that, therefore, if a
household or individual receives a transfer in period t, such that this transfer has a positive impact on
it’s/his income, then the conditional probability that the household or individual would receive
transfers in the future would decline. But in order to capture such dynamics one would have to use
panel data models and such an analysis lies outside the scope of this paper.6
bargaining.” However, the explanatory power of the Pezzin-Schone model has been
limited by the absence of controls for transfer-inducing events and by the selectivity
problem that arises because of the study’s focus on female children.
3. Data and Structure of Empirical Analysis
The first round of survey for the GSOEP data was conducted in 1984 and it is “a
longitudinal survey of private households and persons in the Federal Republic of
Germany” (Haisken-Denew and Frick, 2000). Since then, each year the respondents
are asked a core set of questions which include queries about demographic features of
the households, income and social security benefits of the household members, their
education, health and labour market performance, and expectations about the future.
In 1984, the GSOEP survey covered 5,921 West German households. In 1990,
households in the former German Democratic Republic were included in the survey.
The data on households and individuals from the 1996 and 1997 surveys were
combined to form the sample for the empirical analysis. The approximate number of
households included in the survey during a year was about 6,800, the number of
individuals in each survey being about 13,000.
8
The GSOEP data provides a wealth of information about the possible determinants of
both transfers and income. Specifically, it provides information about the education,
extent of labour market participation, and household wealth of individual respondents.
It also provides demographic information like age, gender, and the number of
children, as well as information about the extended families of individuals, namely,
parents and siblings. Importantly, it provides information about events like marriage,
childbirth, divorce and illness in the lives of the respondents, information that is
crucial for the empirical exercise suggested above. Finally, the data provides
information about monetary transfers.
However, while the surveys provide extensive information about several aspects of an
individual’s (and household’s) “economic” life, it does not provide as much detail
about the (monetary) transfers given and received by households. Specifically, the
survey asks the respondents whether they transferred money to certain categories of
people during the recall period, namely, parents/parents-in-law, children/ children-in-
law, separated/divorced spouse, other relatives, and unrelated persons. On the other
hand, while each respondent is asked whether or not she received private transfers
during the recall period, she is not required to identify the sources of such transfers.
                                                          
8  Certain information like age and level of education attained were available in the 1996 data
set. On the other hand, the data on income, transfers etc. were available from the 1997 data, the recall
period being the previous year. Hence, the relevant information from the 1996 and 1997 data sets had
to be combined to obtain information about all relevant variables.7
As a consequence, it is extremely difficult to match the donors with the corresponding
recipients.
9
Ideally, an analysis of inter vivos transfers should bring together the information
about both the donors and the recipients. But it is often not possible to obtain
information about both donors and recipients, and in such events one has to focus
either on the recipients alone (Bhaumik and Nugent, 2000), or on donors and
recipients separately. The GSOEP data allows separate analysis of donors and
recipients, and hence this study will opt for the latter.
The stylised practice in the existing literature is to examine individually the
determinants of the probability of receiving (or giving) a transfer, and those for the
magnitude of the transfer. As mentioned above, the former analysis involves the use
of a probit or a logit model, with the dependent variable having a value of zero or one,
for transfers received and not received respectively. Hence, if TRANSDUM represents
the dummy dependent variable, the specification would be given by
TRANSDUM = γ 0 + γ 1INCOME + Γ ’X + e [1]
when INCOME refers to the household income of the (potential) recipient, and X
corresponds to the values of the other variables determining the probability of a
transfer. After taking into account the correlations between the explanatory variables,
the specification for the GSOEP data included information on income and wealth of
the recipients (and the households to whom they belonged),
10 the geographical





                                                          
9  For example, after an attempt was made to match donors with the corresponding recipients for
the survey year 1997, only about 30 matches could be made unambiguously. One way to overcome this
problem would be to pool matched observations over a number of years, so as to create a sample of a
reasonable size. However, in order to undertake meaningful econometric exercises for such a sample,
one would have to assume that the observations are independent of each other. However, if indeed
transfers are precipitated by “events” in a recipient’s life, the probability of receiving a transfer in
period t would be strongly correlated with the probability of receiving a transfer in an earlier period.
For example, if a household receives a private transfer in period t on account of childbirth, the absence
of childbirth in the household in the previous j periods would explain why the household did not
receive such transfers between the (t-j)
th period and the t
th period.
10  These include the households’ income net of taxes and private transfers (NETINC96), number
of years of education (NOYEDU96), a dummy variable indicating whether or not potential recipients’
households own the homes they live in (HOWNER96), and another dummy variable indicating whether
or not the recipients’ household has some form of liquid asset like a savings account (LIQAST96).
11  The economic disparities of West Germany and the former GDR have persisted over time.
There is, therefore, reason to believe that the economic opportunities which determine the need for
support from “dynastic” households differ between residents of and workers in these two parts of
Germany. Hence, the specification controls for the impact of the location of home and work with two
dummy variables indicating whether the respondents work in the former GDR (WRKGDR96) and
whether they live in West Germany (LIVFDR96).8
The next step in the stylised literature is to explore the relationship between the
magnitude of transfer and its possible determinants using a Tobit model. If the amount
of transfers received by the households is given by TRANS96, the specification for the
Tobit equation would be
TRANS96 = β 0 + β 1INCOME + Β ’X + u [2]
It is generally argued that the data on transfers is vulnerable to a selection process,
namely, if a household has a high probability of receiving a transfer then the
magnitude of the transfer it receives is also likely to be high (Jurges, 1999). Hence,
the Tobit model given by equation (2) is often estimated by the two-stage Heckman
process which corrects the bias associated with the aforementioned problem of
selection (Jurges, 1999; Bhaumik and Nugent, 2000).
4. Results and Inference
4.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Since this paper intends to focus on intergenerational transfers, it is necessary to
construct the samples of potential donors and recipients such that the empirical results
obtained from analyses of these samples have implications for private transfers across
generations. Hence, people who are between 25 and 40 years of age are defined as
potential recipients, while people who are more than 50 years of age are defined as
potential donors.
14 Moreover, since private inter household transfers aim to alleviate
                                                                                                                                                                     
12  Demographic information includes the age (AGE96) and gender (MALE96) of respondents,
and also the number of dependent children in their households (NOCHLD96). Since the survey does
not identify the source of private transfers, and yet it is reasonable to assume that much of the transfers
originate from “dynastic” households of parents and siblings, two dummy variables are introduced to
account for parents (PALIVE96) and siblings (SALIVE96) who are alive.  Since the marital status of
individuals was significantly correlated with some of the other explanatory variables, a dummy
variable to indicate the marital status of an individual was omitted from the specification. However,
coefficient estimates were also obtained with a dummy variable indicating marital status of an
individual in the specification. The coefficient of the dummy variable itself was consistently negative
and significant, as expected, but its introduction into the specification did not alter the qualitative
analysis to any extent. Hence, in deference to the fact that the indicator of marriage is not orthogonal to
some explanatory variables, it was left out of the specification.
13  The specification controls for five events in the lives of the respondents, namely, illness with
the number of hospital visits as a proxy (NOHVST96), and marriage (MARAGE96), moving in with a
partner (MOVEIN96), divorce (DIVORC96) and childbirth (CBIRTH96) during the recall period.
14  In other words, this paper would analyse only downstream transfers. Trivially, this makes
sense simply because, except for illness, “events” are likely to be important much for in the case of
downstream transfers than for upstream transfers. The empirical rationale for it too is fairly simple,
namely, the relative numbers of upstream and downstream transfers suggest that the latter is clearly the
dominant form of transfers in Germany, at least as indicated by the 1996-97 GSOEP data. For example,
of the 4169 individuals in the full data set of potential donors, only 67 reported transfers to parents or
parents-in-law, while 390 reported transfers to children or children-in-law. It can be argued that people
who are more than 50 years of age are more likely to make downstream rather than upstream transfers,
often simply because they do not have live parents. However, even among the potential “recipients” in
the 25-40 age group, only about 3 percent of the people reported making transfers to parents or parents-9
financial (or liquidity) pressures are more likely to occur among non-upper income
households, and given that such transfers are more likely to have an impact on lower
and middle income households, the choice of the recipients are restricted to
households with values of NETINC96 less than 35,000 marks. Finally, since there is
often a significant and positive correlation between the education and earnings
potential of parents and children, the choice of donors too are restricted to households
with values of NETINC96 less than 35,000 marks. The resultant samples for potential
donors and recipients have 818 and 1765 observations respectively.
15
The descriptive statistics for the potential donors (Table 1) throw up certain
interesting patterns. It can be seen that people who make transfers to parents and
parents-in-law (PTRANSD = 1) are younger than those who provide transfers to
children and children-in-law (CTRANSD = 1), other relatives (RTRANSD = 1) and
non-relatives (UTRANSD = 1), and that therefore a greater proportion of them are
employed.
16 On average, they have higher household income, but a smaller proportion
of them has liquid assets. In other words, it can be hypothesised that while transfers to
elderly parents are made out of current income, transfers to children and others are
made out of the stock of savings.
17 This implies that altruistic parents with foresight
are likely to save in order to insure their children (and perhaps other members of
“dynastic” households) against negative income or positive expenditure shocks. There
is, at the very least, prima facie evidence about the possibility that the savings
behaviour of rational individuals is likely to be influenced by their expectations about
income and expenditure related shocks in the lives of their children and other people
belonging to the “dynastic” households, the shocks themselves being precipitated by
demographic and other events in the lives of the potential recipients.
Further, the individuals in the sample of potential donors had practically no
demographic events – marriage, moving in with a partner, divorce and childbirth –in
                                                                                                                                                                     
in-law. Hence, it would be reasonable to argue that, given the data, an empirical analysis of upstream
transfers would not be very meaningful.
15  The samples of donors and recipients for which the choice of observation was determined
only by age, and not by income, have 2821 and 4169 observations respectively. The robustness of all
results obtained from the age and income restricted samples were verified using the larger and less
restricted sample. While there were differences in the magnitudes of the regression coefficients, and
while in some cases not the same explanatory variables had significantly non-zero coefficients, the
results obtained from the smaller samples were found to be, by and large, robust. The robustness was
particularly evident for the “events” which were introduced in the specifications of the probit and Tobit
models, as well as in the simultaneous equation system in which private transfers and household
incomes were the two endogenous variables.
16  A very small proportion of the respondents seemed to have made transfers to spouses, and
hence the characteristics of those individuals (STRANSD = 1) are not reported in Table 1.
17  Interestingly, the people who do not make transfers to anyone during the recall period
(TRANSD = 0) have incomes that are comparable to incomes of those who make transfers to children,
other relatives and non-relatives, but fewer individuals in the non-donor category have liquid assets
compared to the aforementioned donors.10
their lives during the recall period. However, the non-donors reported significantly
greater incidence of illness, on average, than the donors. Hence, illness as an “event”
possibly influences not only the probability of receiving private transfers, but also the
probability of making transfers.
It is not immediately obvious from the descriptive statistics whether making transfers
to one category of potential recipients (for example, parents) crowds out the transfers
made to other categories of potential recipients.
18 Indeed, it can be seen that a
significantly large proportion of those who make transfers to other relatives and non-
relatives also make transfers to children and children-in-law. A possible explanation
for this apparent positive relationship is that those who make transfers to individuals
who are not within the core of the “dynastic” families, have significant liquid assets
and are, therefore, able to accommodate the needs of both children and those further
away from the core of the “dynasty.”
The descriptive statistics for the potential recipients (Table 3) indicate that, on
average, the household income of the recipients, net of taxes and private transfers, are
about 25 percent lower than that of non-recipients. In other words, it can be
hypothesised that the coefficient of NETINC96 in the probit and Tobit estimations
would be negative. More importantly, however, it is evident that recipients of private
transfers (TRANSDUM = 1) during the recall period experienced higher incidence of
marriage, moving in with partners and childbirth than the non-recipients
(TRANSDUM = 0). This is consistent with our a priori hypothesis that “events” play a
significant role in determining the probability of receiving transfers, and perhaps also
the magnitude of the transfers.
Finally, while almost all of those who received transfers have at least one parent alive,
the probability of having at least a live parent is 14 percentage points lower among
non-recipients. This suggests that parents are perhaps the single most important
source of transfers to those in the 25-40 age group. This is also corroborated by the
data on the potential donors. While 218 of these individuals reported making transfers
to children and children-in-law during the recall period, many fewer individuals made
transfers to the other categories of people.
4.2 Regression Results: Impact of Events on Transfers
A probit analysis (Table 2) indicates that the probability of making an
intergenerational transfer to children and children-in-law is positively and
significantly related to the educational attainment of a potential donor, whether or not
                                                          
18  It is also not obvious as to whether people living and/or working in former GDR are more
likely to make transfers than their West German counterparts.11
she has liquid assets like savings accounts and insurance policies, and the number of
children she has.
19 The positive relationship between the aforementioned probability
and the number of children is easily explained. However, the significance of
NOYEDU96 and LIQAST96 in determining this probability implies, once again, that
savings for old age are meant not only to support old age consumption but also to
provide support to “dynastic” households if such a need arises. Indeed, if the
educational attainment of an individual is viewed as an indicator of her permanent
income which, in turn, determines the quantum of savings, the relationship between
savings for old age and precautionary motives for supporting “dynastic” households
during a donor’s old age comes sharply into focus.
The importance of this precautionary motive for savings, by way of savings for old
age as indicated by the potential donors’ permanent incomes, becomes even more
evident when one takes into consideration the results of the Tobit analyses (Table 2).
It can be seen that the magnitude of the transfers depend only on the educational
attainment of the potential donors, education being a well accepted proxy for
permanent income and hence lifetime savings.
The analyses involving the sample of potential recipients were undertaken using two
different specifications. In the first specification, household income (NETINC96) was
used as an explanatory variable, and hence the probit and Tobit models are as given
by equations (2) and (3). However, since the magnitude of the household income
itself does not indicate the financial condition of the household, the second
specification replaced NETINC96 with per adult equivalent income (PAEINC96).
20
Probit analyses involving these two specifications (Table 4) indicate that, as expected,
the probability of receiving a transfer varies inversely with both the absolute and per
adult equivalence household incomes, as well as with home ownership, and positively
with the existence of at least one live parent. It is not obvious as to why this
probability varies positively with the educational attainment of the potential
recipients. One possible explanation is that parents who bear the cost associated with
higher educational attainment are benevolent in general, and hence are also willing to
provide private transfers more readily.
Importantly, however, the probit analyses indicate that demographic events like
marriage, moving in with partners, and perhaps childbirth significantly increase the
                                                          
19  Since the paper seeks to explore the determinants of intergenerational transfers, and given that
more than 70 percent of the donors made transfers to children and children-in-law, it seemed
reasonable to restrict the analysis to only transfers to the aforementioned younger generation.
20  The determination of adult equivalence for consumers of different age and gender is a
complicated exercise in itself. Since the purpose of this exercise is to test the robustness of the
qualitative results obtained from the Tobit analyses, it was simply assumed that a child’s adult
equivalence is 0.5.12
probability of receiving transfers. The first criticism of the stylised empirical
literature, explored in some detail in sections 1 and 2, is, therefore, vindicated. The
importance of such events in determining the probability and magnitude of private
transfers is further highlighted by the Tobit analyses (Tables 5 and 6). Indeed, the
results of the Tobit estimations indicate that marriage, moving in with partners, and
childbirth have a fairly significant impact on the magnitude of transfers received.
21
The Tobit analyses also suggest that, as with the probability of receiving transfers, the
magnitude of transfers varies negatively with absolute and per adult equivalent
income, and positively with the existence of at least one live parent. Both the probit
and Tobit estimates also indicate that the probability of receiving transfers, as also the
magnitude of the transfers are lower for men. Further, the probability and the
magnitude declines if a potential recipient lives in West Germany or works in former
GDR. Since residence in West Germany implies access to more occupational (and
perhaps financial) opportunities, the negative sign of the LIVFDR96 variable is not
surprising. The similar sign of the WRKGDR96 variable can perhaps be explained by
the possibility that if a person has a job in former GDR, he is possibly in a stronger
financial position compared to a vast majority of his peers and “dynastic” households,
and hence he is less likely to receive transfers.
4.3 Simultaneity Between Income and Transfer
The stylised probit and Tobit models indicate that there is a strong case in favour of
using events as explanatory variables for transfers received. However, as explained in
an earlier section, single equation models may not be appropriate for the analysis of
transfers if the recall period is significantly large, namely, one year. Indeed, results
obtained from the Hausman test suggests that NETINC96 is endogenously determined
and hence cannot be treated as an exogenous variable in the Tobit equation that is
used to estimate the relationship between the magnitude of transfers and its possible
determinants.
22 Hence, in order to account for the endogenous nature of NETINC96, a
system of equations with NETINC96 and private transfers as endogenous variables
have to be jointly estimated.
                                                          
21  It is somewhat difficult to explain why the magnitude of transfers would vary inversely with
the number of hospital visits. A possible explanation is that in the presence of publicly provided
medical coverage and disability insurance the financial burden of illness is perhaps not as severe in
Germany as in some other countries, and hence the coefficient of NOHVST96 is picking up effects of
correlation between transfers and the number of hospital visits that cannot be explained by any causal
relationship between hospital visits, financial burden and transfers.
22 The  variable  NETINC96 was regressed on all exogenous variables, and the residuals were
saved as variable NETINC96R. Next, in the Tobit specification, NETINC96R was introduced as an
additional explanatory variable. The coefficient of NETINC96R was significantly different from zero at
the 1 percent level of significance. This suggested that the estimates of the Tobit model, which treated
NETINC96 as an exogenous variable, are not consistent.13
In the earlier analyses, the unit of analysis was the individual. Since two people in the
same household may have different probabilities of receiving transfers, depending on
their gender, whether or not their parents and other “dynastic” individuals are alive,
the (unaccounted for) differences in the financial abilities of the potential donors etc.,
this approach was meaningful. However, in order to analyse the determinants of
transfers within a simultaneous equation framework, it is necessary to have similar
units of measure for income and transfers. Since NETINC96 is a measure of
household income, the measure of transfer used for the analysis should be gross
private transfers received by the household, i.e., it is the sum of private transfers
received by all individuals within the household (PVTTRN96).
Given that the household became the new unit of analysis, some other changes had to
be introduced. Specifically, individual-specific variables like age and educational
attainment were reconstructed as average of the age and numbers of years of
education of the adults in the household. Further, the variable NOHVST96 was
reconstituted to reflect the total number of hospital visits made by adult individuals in
the households. At the same time, the dummy variables PALIVE96 and SALIVE96
were accorded value unity if any member of the household had a live parent and
sibling respectively. Similarly, the dummy variable WRKGDR96 was given the value
unity if any one of the adult household members worked in West Germany. Finally,
the variable MALE96 was replaced by SPOUSE96, a dummy variable which indicated
whether or not at least one pair of household adults were married.
The aforementioned system of equations, therefore, were given by
PVTTRN96 = φ 0 + φ 1NETINC96 + Φ ’X1 + v1 [3]
and NETINC96 = σ 0 + σ 1PVTTRN96 + Ω ’X2 + v2 [4]
where X1 and X2 comprise information about the exogenous variables.
23 Joint
estimation of this system of equations, one of which involves Tobit while the other
                                                          
23  The explanatory variables for transfers in equation (3) are the same as those in equation (2)
with one exception, namely, MALE96 was replaced by SPOUSE96. The explanatory variables for
NETINC96 in equation (4) included PVTTRN96, average educational attainment of household
members, the geographical location of the households’ home and workplace, and dummy variables to
capture existence of wealth and “dynastic” individuals like parents and siblings. Additionally, it
included a dummy variable (ESTAT96) to indicate whether or not at least one adult member of the
household was employed during the recall period, and an interaction between PALIVE96 and
SALIVE96. This interaction term was introduced to capture the dynamics whereby the existence of an
elderly parent may adversely affect effective labour force participation, but the coexistence of a sibling
may ease the demand on the time of a household. Finally, the “events” were included. While marriage
and moving in with a partner were expected to augment household income additively, and divorce
impact household income negatively through the same arithmetic algorithm, childbirth was expected to14
involves OLS, is computationally costly. Hence, the estimation of the coefficients of
equations (3) and (4) were undertaken by way of the two-stage procedure suggested in
Maddala (1983). The estimates of the regression coefficients are presented in Table 7.
Since the focus of this analysis is on transfers, it would be reasonable to focus only on
the signs and significance levels of the coefficients of the explanatory variables in the
Tobit equation. Importantly, income continues to have a negative and significant
coefficient, and existence of live parents and “events” – specifically, divorce and
childbirth – continue to have the expected impact on the magnitude of private
transfers.
24 At the same time, control variables like NOCHLD96 and WRKGDR96
have experienced a reversal of their signs. However, the most striking difference
between the results of the single and simultaneous equation frameworks is that in the
former NOYEDU96 had a positive sign while in the latter the proxy for educational
attainment has a negative sign. As mentioned above, it is possible to accord some
plausible explanation to a positive sign of the NOYEDU96 variable. However, if
education is a proxy for permanent income, it is reasonable to assume that higher
levels of educational attainment would have a negative impact on the magnitude of
private transfers. Indeed, irrespective of the magnitude of his current income, if a
potential recipient is perceived to have a high permanent income, it is likely to be
assumed that he has greater capacity to borrow against his future (higher) income
stream, and hence he is likely to receive less support from “dynastic” households.
At the very least, the reversal of signs of coefficients of key explanatory variables in
the transfer/Tobit equation suggests that is imperative to take into consideration the
simultaneity between private transfers and income. Indeed, while it is reassuring to
note that the signs of important determinants of private transfers like income and
events, that are rooted in economic theory, have expected signs, and are hence robust,
the importance of the exercise involving the simultaneous equation system is not
diminished. Since in empirical analyses of economic phenomena robustness of
estimates is important for meaningful policy discussions, ignoring the possibility that
household income is endogenously determined might be a costly oversight.
                                                                                                                                                                     
have an impact on household income by way of a negative impact on the “time constraint” of the
households.
24  Note that although “events” continue to matter, the relative importance of the events differ
between the single equation Tobit model, and the simultaneous equation framework. In much of the
earlier analysis, marriage and moving in with a partner were the triggers for flow of private transfers.
However, in the simultaneous equation framework, childbirth and divorce have gained importance
while marriage and moving in with a partner no longer have a significant impact on the magnitude of
private transfers.15
5. Concluding Remarks
The literature on inter vivos and intergenerational transfers that has developed
significantly since Cox’s (1987) seminal contribution has two lacunae. First, it has
ignored the role of specific events like marriage and childbirth in triggering private
transfers. Second, it has ignored the possibility that household or individual income,
an important explanatory variable for private transfers, may be endogenous, and that
therefore a simultaneous equation framework may be more appropriate for analysing
the determinants of private transfers. This paper has addressed both of these issues.
The analysis embodied in the paper has taken into consideration different
specifications as well as different modelling paradigms – single equation probit and
Tobit models, as well as a Tobit-OLS simultaneous equation system – and the signs
and significance levels of important determinants of private transfers is fairly robust.
Specifically, current household income unambiguously has a negative impact on
receiving private transfers, while the aforementioned events, except for hospital visits,
unambiguously have a positive impact on such transfers. At the same time, however,
reversal in the sign of an important control variable like the educational attainment of
the potential recipients, a proxy for their permanent incomes, indicates the necessity
to check for endogeneity of household or personal income.
Apart from highlighting the lacunae in the econometric methodology used for
empirical analyses of the determinants of private transfers, the paper also throws light
on an issue that may have substantial relevance for macroeconomic analysis. It was
proposed earlier in the paper that savings of individuals are aimed not only to support
old age consumption but also to insure children and other members of “dynastic”
families against negative income shocks and positive expenditure shocks. Such
shocks are usually brought about by events such as illness, marriage, divorce and
childbirth. The empirical analysis contained in the paper suggests that a simultaneous
equation framework, which endogenises household income, is more appropriate for
the analyses of private transfers. The simultaneous equation framework, in turn,
suggests that divorce and childbirth as demographic events significantly determine the
magnitude of private inter household transfers.
In most economically developed countries, divorce rate is increasing while the
fertility rate has stabilised to a low level. In other words, for an individual, the
probability of a childbirth in the lives of members of his “dynastic” household is low
yet stable, while the probability of a divorce is rising over time. Hence, if the
individual saves to insure the aforementioned household members against negative
income and positive expenditure shocks, his aggregate savings would increase in
response to the increasing probability of a divorce. The implication of such behaviour16
for aggregate household savings is obvious. However, the impact of divorce on the
magnitude of transfers and hence, in turn, on the magnitude of the donor’s savings, is
not substantial. On the other hand, if developed countries have been witnessing
postponement of childbirth, and if such behaviour is altered in the future such that two
age cohorts decide to bear children within the same time period, there would be a
steep increase in the incidence of childbirth. Given that childbirth in a recipient’s
household has a substantial impact on the magnitude of the private transfers it
receives, such a phenomenon is likely to result in a steep increase in the magnitude of
aggregate household savings.
The study has been limited by the fact that, given the nature of the questionnaire, it is
not possible to match sufficient number of donors with recipients during a survey
year. Hence, one simple yet important extension of this research endeavour is to
examine the impact of “events” and the possible endogeneity of income with data that
allows matching of donors and recipients. Further, this study has abstracted from an
important form of inter vivos, and especially intergenerational, transfers, namely, non-
monetary transfers. Therefore, a second possible extension involves a fusion of this
study with that by Pezzin and Schone (1998). Finally, it would be interesting to
determine whether the intuition embodied in this paper holds true for private transfers
in countries with public institutions and social norms that are significantly different
from those in western developed countries.17
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics (Older Generation)






















NOYEDU96 11.09   (2.54) 11.92   (1.63) 11.11   (2.23) 12.53   (2.44) 10.77   (2.10)
SIZOHH96 81.93  (32.85) 80.62  (34.39) 72.76  (35.90) 75.72  (30.49) 78.39  (31.44)
HOWNER96 0.37   (0.50) 0.41   (0.49) 0.35   (0.48) 0.41   (0.50) 0.39   (0.48)
LIQAST96 0.68   (0.47) 0.90   (0.29) 0.94   (0.23) 0.96   (0.18) 0.85   (0.35)
Geographical location:
WRKGDR96 0.06   (0.25) 0.03   (0.18) 0   (0.00) 0.03   (0.18) 0.03   (0.17)
LIVFDR96 0.37   (0.50) 0.67   (0.46) 0.67   (0.47) 0.48   (0.50) 0.73   (0.44)
Individual and household characteristics:
AGE96 57.43   (4.83) 66.97   (8.44) 70.23   (9.08) 65.72   (8.14) 66.26   (8.59)
MALE96 0.43   (0.51) 0.51   (0.50) 0.33   (0.47) 0.44   (0.50) 0.38   (0.48)
ESTAT96 0.50   (0.51) 0.19   (0.39) 0.09   (0.30) 0.17   (0.38) 0.13   (0.34)
MSTAT96 1.56   (0.96) 1.74   (1.09) 1.87   (0.96) 1.75   (0.98) 1.75   (1.09)
NOCHLD96 1.56   (1.15) 2.20   (1.32) 1.45   (1.43) 1.00   (1.06) 1.79   (1.44)
AEQUIV96 2.06   (0.87) 1.77   (0.59) 1.61   (0.56) 1.72   (0.59) 1.90   (0.70)
PALIVE96 0.68   (0.47) 0.11   (0.31) 0.08   (0.28) 0.10   (0.30) 0.13   (0.33)
SALIVE96 0.68   (0.47) 0.66   (0.47) 0.60   (0.49) 0.62   (0.49) 0.60   (0.48)
Events:
NOHVST96 0   (0.00) 0.27   (0.97) 0.21   (0.50) 0.31   (0.76) 0.91   (1.57)
MARAGE96 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00) 0.002   (0.04)
MOVEIN96 0   (0.00) 0.004   (0.06) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00) 0.002   (0.05)
DIVORC96 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00)
CBIRTH96 0.06   (0.25) 0   (0.00) 0.01   (0.11) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00)
Incidence of transfer:
PTRANSD 0.009   (0.09) 0.01   (0.11) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00)
CTRANSD 0.12   (0.34) 0.22   (0.42) 0.31   (0.47) 0   (0.00)
STRANSD 0   (0.00) 0.004   (0.06) 0.01   (0.11) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00)
RTRANSD 0.06   (0.25) 0.07   (0.26) 0.31   (0.47) 0   (0.00)





















































N 16 218 71 29 146520
Table 2
Determinants of Probability and Magnitude of Transfers




Constant -2.77   (0.00) -3185.78   (0.21) -3232.33   (0.18)
INVMILLS 7110.14   (0.00)
Income and wealth:
NETINC96 1.31E-06   (0.76) -0.001   (0.93) 0.02   (0.35)
NOYEDU96 0.08   (0.00) 180.71   (0.07) 186.82   (0.05)
HOWNER96 0.09   (0.26) 516.95   (0.28) 516.16   (0.25)
LIQAST96 0.25   (0.04) 508.28   (0.44) 503.10   (0.41)
Geographical location:
WRKFDR96 0.03   (0.87) 280.66   (0.83) 298.94   (0.81)
LIVGDR96 -0.08   (0.36) -419.06   (0.43) -410.11   (0.41)
Individual  characteristics:
AGE96 0.001   (0.83) 8.08   (0.79) 17.15   (0.55)
MALE96 -0.009   (0.91) 71.27   (0.87) 81.92   (0.85)
NOCHLD96 0.14   (0.00) 190.98   (0.23) 196.72   (0.19)
Events:
NOHVST96 -0.01   (0.65) -0.51   (0.99) -2.47   (0.98)
Crowding out:
PTRANSD 0.20   (0.64) -276.20   (0.91) -287.12   (0.90)
STRANSD -0.71   (0.25) -1335.13   (0.64) -1432.62   (0.59)
UTRANSD 0.53   (0.04) -227.39   (0.86) -241.81   (0.83)
RTRANSD 0.49   (0.00) -294.12   (0.86) -310.28   (0.85)
Statistic:
Log likelihood -622.12 -3620.55 -3566.7421
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics (Younger Generation)
TRANSDUM = 0 TRANSDUM = 1
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variable:
TRNS96 0 0 8534.08 5722.22
Income and wealth:
NETINC96 24032.41 8704.22 17949.98 9953.57
NOYEDU96 11.87 2.53 12.21 2.63
SIZOHH96 74.90 33.86 72.75 30.74
HOWNER96 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.31
LIQAST96 0.74 0.43 0.71 0.45
Geographical location:
WRKGDR96 0.17 0.37 0.06 0.24
LIVFDR96 0.27 0.44 0.15 0.36
Individual and household characteristics:
AGE96 31.83 4.18 31.13 3.92
MALE96 0.49 0.50 0.33 0.47
ESTAT96 0.67 0.46 0.31 0.46
MSTAT96 2.05 1.14 2.68 1.31
NOCHLD96 0.27 0.66 0.36 0.79
AEQUIV96 2.13 0.95 2.04 0.84
PALIVE96 0.84 0.35 0.98 0.12
SALIVE96 0.81 0.39 0.83 0.37
Events:
NOHVST96 0.15 0.45 0.12 0.37
MARAGE96 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.26
MOVEIN96 0.03 0.18 0.09 0.28
DIVORC96 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12




Determinants of Probability of Receiving Transfers
Specification 1 Specification 2
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value




NOYEDU96 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.04
HOWNER96 -0.30 0.18 -0.45 0.05
LIQAST96 0.03 0.84 0.05 0.72
Geographical location:
WRKGDR96 -0.43 0.08 -0.45 0.07
LIVFDR96 -0.32 0.08 -0.36 0.05
Individual and household characteristics:
AGE96 -0.01 0.51 -0.01 0.29
MALE96 -0.33 0.02 -0.28 0.06
NOCHLD96 0.02 0.36 0.03 0.70
PALIVE96 1.08 0.00 1.21 0.00
SALIVE96 -0.004 0.98 0.06 0.75
Events:
NOHVST96 -0.42 0.05 -0.30 0.14
MARAGE96 0.85 0.01 0.95 0.00
MOVEIN96 0.57 0.04 0.78 0.01
DIVORC96 -0.15 0.81 0.17 0.79
CBIRTH96 0.63 0.03 0.34 0.25
Statistic:
Log likelihood -190.43 -186.0323
Table 5
Determinants of Magnitude of Transfer Received
Specification 1 Specification 2
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value




NOYEDU96 586.09 0.13 758.83 0.05
HOWNER96 -5154.64 0.11 -7074.76 0.03
LIQAST96 943.67 0.67 1286.91 0.57
Geographical location:
WRKGDR96 -7245.59 0.05 -7404.90 0.04
LIVFDR96 -4560.22 0.08 -5068.72 0.05
Individual and household characteristics:
AGE96 -129.78 0.62 -243.07 0.35
MALE96 -4480.18 0.03 -3677.43 0.08
NOCHLD96 1460.98 0.29 709.51 0.60
PALIVE96 16020.27 0.00 17736.78 0.00
SALIVE96 2.39 0.99 1097.29 0.68
Events:
NOHVST96 -6358.31 0.03 -4484.77 0.12
MARAGE96 13073.06 0.00 14583.18 0.00
MOVEIN96 8447.992 0.03 11096.20 0.00
DIVORC96 -1798.48 0.83 3040.47 0.73
CBIRTH96 8942.52 0.03 4434.28 0.28
Statistic:
Log likelihood -845.99 -842.4724
Table 6
Determinants of Magnitude of Transfer
(after correcting for selection bias)
Specification 1 Specification 2
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Constant -17593.31 0.04 -21240.03 0.04




NOYEDU96 290.95 0.25 337.87 0.21
HOWNER96 -7800.36 0.00 -8401.69 0.00
LIQAST96 1960.40 0.23 2570.55 0.13
Geographical location:
WRKGDR96 -6985.99 0.00 -6198.58 0.02
LIVFDR96 -1485.36 0.44 -1299.71 0.52
Individual and household characteristics:
AGE96 179.62 0.36 34.28 0.86
MALE96 -1720.81 0.31 -879.32 0.61
NOCHLD96 1062.68 0.21 788.27 0.37
PALIVE96 3371.45 0.43 6174.44 0.24
SALIVE96 360.13 0.83 1954.51 0.28
Events:
NOHVST96 -5739.72 0.00 -3460.74 0.08
MARAGE96 11369.89 0.00 12606.02 0.00
MOVEIN96 6278.45 0.00 8258.91 0.00
DIVORC96 561.29 0.91 5979.21 0.26
CBIRTH96 5839.04 0.01 1874.45 0.42
Statistic:
Log likelihood -654.13 -655.7225
Table 7
Simultaneous Determination of Magnitude of Transfer and Income
NETINC96 PVTTRN96
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value




NOYEDU96 264.34 0.00 -337.39 0.00
HOWNER96 -2689.62 0.00 5.59 0.29
LIQAST96 370.97 0.52 4829.79 0.00
Geographical location:
WRKGDR96 -3252.66 0.00 5112.39 0.00
LIVFDR96 -2974.12 0.00 -3004.98 0.00
Individual and household characteristics:
AGE96 -64.80 0.28 193.25 0.00
SPOUSE96 -3264.38 0.00 -914.10 0.00
ESTAT96 5339.02 0.00
NOCHLD96 663.35 0.07 -757.39 0.00
PALIVE96 3219.93 0.01 8166.89 0.00




NOHVST96 -3816.17 0.00 -5165.61 0.00
MARAGE96 15806.23 0.00 -4.63 0.64
MOVEIN96 4585.11 0.02 3.14 0.66
DIVORC96 -4228.61 0.04 89.74 0.00





Note: PVTTRN96(F) predicted values for PVTTRN96, after the variable was regressed on all
  exogenous variables and instruments
NETINC96(F) predicted values for NETINC96, after the variable was regressed on all
exogenous variables and instruments